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Abstract
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem states that any constitution which satisfies Transitivity, In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity is a dictatorship. Wilson derived
properties of constitutions satisfying Transitivity and IIA for unrestricted domains where ties
are allowed. In this paper we consider the case where only strict preferences are allowed. In
this case we derive a new short proof of Arrow theorem and further obtain a new and complete
characterization of all functions satisfying Transitivity and IIA. The proof is based on a variant
of the method of pivotal voters due to Barbera.
1 Introduction
Arrow’s Impossibility theorem [1, 2] states that certain properties cannot hold simultaneously for
constitutions on three or more alternatives. Consider A = {a, b, . . . , }, a set of k ≥ 3 alternatives.
A (strict) transitive preference over A is a ranking of the alternatives from top to bottom where
ties are not allowed. Such a ranking corresponds to a permutation σ of the elements 1, . . . , k where
σi is the rank of alternative i.
We consider a society of n individuals labeled 1, . . . , n, each of them has a transitive preference.
A constitution is a function F that associates to every n-tuple σ = (σ(1), . . . , σ(n)) of transitive
preferences (also called profile), and every pair of alternatives a, b a preference between a and b.
Some basic properties of constitutions are:
• Transitivity. The constitution F is transitive if F (σ) is transitive for all σ. In other words,
for all σ and for all three alternatives a, b and c, if F (σ) prefers a to b, and prefers b to c, it
also prefers a to c.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The constitution F satisfies the IIA property
if for every pair of alternatives a and b, the social ranking of a vs. b (higher or lower) depends
only on their relative rankings by all voters.
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• Unanimity. The constitution F satisfies Unanimity if the social outcome ranks a above b
whenever all individuals rank a above b.
• Dictatorship. The constitution F is a dictatorship by individual i or the i’th dictator if the
social outcome ranking of voter i so that either F (σ) = σ(i) for all σ or F (σ) = −σ(i) for all
σ where −σ(i) is the ranking σk(i) > σk−1(i) . . . σ2(i) > σ1(i) by reversing the ranking σ.
• Non-Imposition (NI). The constitution F is a Non-Imposition (NI) if every transitive prefer-
ence order is achievable by some profile of transitive preferences.
• Weak Non Imposition (WNI). The constitution F is a Weak Non-Imposition (WNI) if for
every pair of alternatives a, b, there exists a profile where the constitution ranks a above b.
• Non Degeneracy (ND). The constitution F is a Degenerate if there exists an alternative a
such that for all profiles F ranks at the top (bottom). The constitution F is Non Degenerate
(ND) if it is not degenerate.
We note that
Unanimity =⇒ NI =⇒ WNI =⇒ ND,
and that non of the reverse implications hold.
Our definition of dictator is more general than the standard definition as dictatorship. To see
that this is needed in the setup considered here, look at the constitution on 3 alternatives and
a single voter that assigns to the ranking σ1 > σ2 > σ3, the reverse ranking σ3 > σ2 > σ1.
This constitution satisfies Transitivity, IIA and WNI. However it is not a dictator according to
the ”standard definition”. Note furthermore that the only dictator function which satisfies the
Unanimity condition is the identity map and therefore Theorem 1.2 implies Theorem 1.1.
The basic idea behind Arrow’s impossibility is that there is some ”tension” between IIA and
Transitivity. The original statement of Arrow theorem [1] states that if the constitution F is
monotone, satisfies Non-Imposition, IIA and Transitivity then F has to be a dictator. Later Arrow
derived a stronger statement [2]
Theorem 1.1. Any constitution on three or more alternatives which satisfies Transitivity, IIA and
Unanimity is a dictatorship.
The result above is also known to hold when individuals are allowed to have as their preferences
all the strict preferences as well as all preferences with ties.
In our first result we relax the unanimity condition and show that
Theorem 1.2. Any constitution on three or more alternatives which satisfies Transitivity, IIA and
WNI is a dictatorship.
A similar result was proven in a beautiful paper by Wilson [7] in the case where the voters
preferences include preferences with ties.
We briefly comment on the difference between the two results.
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• We note that in general one cannot conclude impossibility results for one domain of preferences
given that the same impossibility result hold for a larger domain of preferences. Therefore
Wilson’s result does not imply ours.
• A second comment relates to the conclusion of the theorem. While our theorem explicitly
characterizes all 2n functions that satisfy Transitivity, IIA and WNI, Wilson’s result only
asserts that such a function is a weak dictator in the following sense. Whenever the dictator
states a strict preference, this preference is followed by society. However if the dictator
preference ties two alternatives, the social outcome may be a non-trivial functions of the
other voters preferences. Wilson does not give a complete characterization of the functions
satisfying Transitivity, IIA and WNI in this setup.
• Thirdly, the two proofs are quite different. In particular, the proof given here is based on a
”local” argument involving 2 voters and 3 alternatives. The local nature of the proof allowed
to use the proof technique developed here to derive a quantitative Arrow theorem in follow
up work by the author (for more details see the conclusion section).
• We finally like to note that while Wilson’s result does not imply the results proven here, it
seems possible to adapt his proof strategy in order to obtain the same results. However, such
a proof does not seem to be as helpful in extending the results to quantitative setups.
Next we consider similar results where the WNI condition is omitted. In some scenarios, where
some opinions should be given negative considerations, the Unanimity condition is not natural. The
WNI condition is much more natural. If the WNI condition does not hold then the constitution F
always ranks a above b for some alternatives a, b.
Note that in this case we must allow to include any constitution on two alternatives. Similarly it
should allow a constitution on 4 alternatives a, b, c, d such that a, b are always ranked above c, d,the
a vs. b, ranking is decided arbitrarily according to the individual a vs. preferences and similarly
for the c vs. d ranking.
For the characterization it would be useful to write A >F B for the statement that for all σ it
holds that F (σ) ranks all alternatives in A above all alternatives in B. We will further write FA for
the constitution F restricted to the alternatives in A. The IIA condition implies that FA depends
only on the individual rankings of the alternatives in the set A.
Theorem 1.3. A constitution F on k ≥ 2 alternatives satisfies IIA and Transitivity if and only
if the following hold. There exist a partition of the set of alternatives into disjoint sets A1, . . . , Ar
such that:
•
A1 >F A2 >F . . . >F Ar,
• For all As s.t. |As| ≥ 3 there exists a voter j such that FAs is a dictator on voter j.
• For all As such that |As| = 2, the constitution FAs is an arbitrary non-constant function of
the preferences on the alternatives in A3.
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Note that for sets s such that |As| = 2, the constitution FAs is arbitrary (except for the constant
functions). Note furthermore that Theorem 1.3 implies Theorem 1.2 since the WNI condition
implies that the partition into sets contains only one set - the set of all candidates. Again, we note
that a similar result for preferences with ties is given by Wilson [7]. As before we note that our
result gives a full characterization while Wilson’s only a partial characterization, Wilson’s result
do not imply ours and the proof is different.
1.1 Acknowledgement
We thank Salvador Barbera for the reference to the work of Wilson [7].
2 A Short Proof of Arrow’s Theorem
Our proof proceeds of Theorem 1.2 proceeds in 3 steps - the base case is n = 2 voters and k = 3
alternatives. We then generalize to k = 3 alternatives and any number of voters. Finally we prove
the result for arbitrary number of voters and alternatives. We later prove Theorem 1.3 which
requires a more detailed understanding of which alternatives ”interact”.
2.1 Preliminaries
Recall that we denote the profile of n rankings by σ = (σ(1), . . . , σ(n)). For each pair of alternatives
a, b we write xa>b = (xa>b(1), . . . , xa>b(n)) for the vector whose i’th coordinate is 1 if voter i prefers
a to b and −1 if voter i prefer b to a.
Proposition 2.1. The IIA assumption implies that for all a, b there exists a function fa>b :
{−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} such that the constitution ranks a ahead of b if fa>b(xa>b) = 1 and ranks
b ahead of a if fa>b(xa>b) = −1.
As in previous proofs [3, 4] a key notion is that of pivotal voter. Recall that voter i is pivotal
for f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} if there exists x, y ∈ {−1, 1}n such that xj = yj for j 6= i and xi 6= yi
and f(x) 6= f(y). We will need the following easy facts:
Proposition 2.2. The following hold:
• If f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} is not constant then f has at least one pivotal voter.
• Assume that there exists a voter 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that for all pairs of alternatives a, b it holds
that either fa>b is constant or i is the only pivotal voter for fa>b then F (σ) is of the form
F (σ) = G(σ(i)) for some function G.
Proof. The first assertion follows by noting that changing any single coordinate in x will not change
the value of f and therefore the same is true for any number of coordinates so f has to be constant.
The second assertion follows from the first by noting that fixing the ranking of voter i results in
a constant function of the other voters. Therefore there exists a function G of voter i such that
F (σ) = G(σ(i)).
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2.2 Different Pivots for Different Choices imply Non-Transitivity
We begin by considering the case of 3 candidates named a, b, c and two voters named 1 and 2. We
note that
Proposition 2.3. For all i:
{(xa>bi (σi), x
b>c
i (σi), x
c>a
i (σi) : σi ∈ S3} = {−1, 1}
3 \ {(1, 1, 1), (−1,−1,−1)}.
Similarly, the outcome of the constitution given by fa>b, f b>c and f c>a is non-transitive if and only
if
(fa>b(xa>b), f b>c(xb>c), f c>a(xc>a)) ∈ {(−1,−1,−1), (1, 1, 1)}.
Our main technical tool is the following result which is a rediscovery of a result of Barbera [3].
The proof in [3] uses Arrow’s logic relation notation. We give the proof using binary bits below.
Theorem 2.4. Consider a social choice function on 3 candidates a, b and c and n voters denoted
1, 2, . . . , n. Assume that the social choice function satisfies that IIA condition and that there exists
voters i 6= j such that voter i is pivotal for fa>b and voter j is pivotal for f b>c. Then there exists
a profile for which (fa>b(xa>b), f b>c(xb>c), f c>a(xc>a)) is non-transitive.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that voter 1 is pivotal for fa>b and voter 2 is pivotal for
f b>c. Therefore there exist x2, . . . , xn satisfying
fa>b(+1, x2, . . . , xn) 6= f
a>b(−1, x2, . . . , xn) (1)
and y1, y3, . . . , yn satisfying
f b>c(y1,+1, y3, . . . , yn) 6= f
b>c(y1,−1, y3, . . . , yn). (2)
Let z1 = −y1 and zi = −xi for i ≥ 2. By (1) and (2) we may choose x1 and y2 so that
fa>b(x) = f b>c(y) = f(z),
where x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn) and z = (z1, . . . , zn). Note further, that by construction
for all i it holds that
(xi, yi, zi) /∈ {(1, 1, 1), (−1,−1,−1)},
and therefore there exists a profile σ such that
x = x(σ), y = y(σ), z = z(σ).
The proof follows.
5
2.3 A Proof of Arrow Theorem
Proof. Assume the constitution satisfies the IIA property. For each pair of candidate let fa>b be
the choice function between alternatives a and b and let P a>b be the set of pivotal voters for fa>b.
By the Unanimity assumption if follows that fa>b takes both values 1 and −1 and therefore
P a>b is not empty.
Assuming that Transitivity holds, Theorem 2.4 implies that for all a, b, c it holds that P a>b =
P b>c = {i} for some i. Note that this implies that for all a, b, c, d it holds that P a>b = P b>c =
P c>d = {i}. In other words, there exist a voter i such that for all a, b, the voter i is the single
pivotal voter for fa>b.
This implies that for all a, b either fa>b(x) = xi or f
a>b = −xi and by Unanimity it must be that
fa>b(x) = xi for all a, b. This implies that the constitution is a dictator on voter i as needed.
2.4 n voters, 3 Candidates
In order to prove Theorem 1.2 we need the following proposition regarding constitutions of a single
voter.
Proposition 2.5. Consider a constitution F of a single voter and three alternatives {a, b, c} which
satisfies IIA and transitivity. Then exactly one of the following conditions hold:
• F is constant. In other words, F (σ) = τ for all σ and some fixed τ ∈ S(3).
• There exists an alternative c such that c is always ranked at the top (bottom) of the ranking
and fa>b(x) = x or fa>b(x) = −x.
• F (σ) = σ for all σ
• F (σ) = −σ for all σ.
Proof. Assume F is not constant, then there exist two alternatives a, b such that fa>b is not constant
and therefore fa>b(x) = x or fa>b(x) = −x. Let c be the remaining alternative. If c is always
ranked at the bottom or the top the claim follows. Otherwise one of the functions fa>c or f b>c is
not constant. We claim that in this case all three functions are non-constant. Suppose by way of
contradiction that f c>a is the constant 1. This means that c is always ranked on top of a. However,
since fa>b is non-constant there exists a value x such that fa>b(x) = 1 and similarly there exist a
value y such that f b>c(y) = 1. Let σ be a ranking whose a > b preference is given by x and whose
b > c preferences are given by y. Then G(σ) satisfies that a is preferred to b and b is preferred to
c. Thus by transitivity it follows that a is preferred to c - a contradiction. The same argument
applied if f c>a is the constant −1 or if f b>c is a constant function.
We have thus established that all three functions fa>b, f b>c and f c>a are of the form f(x) = x of
f(x) = −x. To conclude we want to show that all three functions are identical. Suppose otherwise.
Then two of the functions have the same sign while the third has a different sign. Without loss of
generality assume fa>b(x) = f b>c(x) = x and f c>a(x) = −x. Then looking at the profile a > b > c
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we see that σ′ = F (σ) must satisfy a > b and b > c but also c > a a contradiction. A similar proof
applies when fa>b(x) = f b>c(x) = −x and f c>a(x) = x.
Theorem 2.6. Any constitution on three alternatives which satisfies Transitivity, IIA and ND is
a dictator.
Proof. There are two cases to consider. The first case is where two of the functions fa>b, f b>c
and f c>a are constant. Without loss of generality assume that fa>b and f b>c are constant. Note
that if fa>b is the constant 1 and f b>c is the constant −1 then b is ranked at the bottom for all
social outcomes in contradiction to the ND condition. A similar contradiction is derived if fa>b
is the constant −1 and f b>c is the constant 1. We thus conclude that fa>b = f b>c. However by
transitivity this implies that f c>a is also a constant function and f c>a = −fa>b.
The second case to consider is where at least two of the functions fa>b, f b>c and f c>a are not
constant. Assume without loss of generality that fa>b, f b>c are non-constant. Therefore, each has
at least one pivotal voter. From Theorem 2.4 it follows that there exists a single voter i such that
each of the functions is either constant, or has a single pivotal voter i. We thus conclude that F
is of the form F (σ) = G(σ(i)) for some function G. Applying Proposition 2.5 shows that either
G(σ) = σ or G(σ) = −σ and concludes the proof.
2.5 General Proof
We now prove Theorem 1.2.
Proof. Note that for any set of three alternatives A = {a, b, c} the condition of Theorem 2.6 hold
for FA. This implies in particular that for all a, b either f
a>b(x) = −xi or f
a>b(x) = xi for some
voter i. It remains to show that for all a, b, c, d it holds that fa>b(x) = f c>d(x) which implies that
there exist an i such that F (σ) = σi or F (σ) = −σi as needed.
We first consider the case where {a, b} and {c, d} intersect in one element, say d = a. In this
case, Theorem 2.6 applied to the rankings of a, b and c, implies the desired result.
We finally need to consider the case where {a, b} and {c, d} are disjoint. Applying Theorem 2.6 to
{a, b, c} we conclude that one of the functions fa>b(x) = f b>c(x). Then applying it to alternatives
{b, c, d} we conclude that f b>c(x) = f c>d(x). The proof follows.
3 The Characterization Theorem
We now prove Theorem 1.3. Given a set of alternatives A′ ⊂ A and an alternative b /∈ A, we write
b ∼ A′ if if there exist two alternatives a, a′ ∈ As and two profiles σ and σ
′ s.t. F (σ) ranks b above
a and F (σ′) ranks a′ above b. Note that if it does not hold that b ∼ A′ then either {b} >F A
′ or
A′ >F {b}.
We will use the following lemmas.
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Lemma 3.1. Let F be a transitive constitution satisfying IIA and A1, . . . , Ar, {b} disjoint sets of
alternatives satisfying A1 >F A2 >F . . . >F Ar. Then either
• There exists an 1 ≤ s ≤ r + 1 such
A1 >F . . . >F As−1 > {b} >F As >F . . . >F Ar, (3)
or
• There exist an 1 ≤ s ≤ r such that b ∼ Ar and
A1 >F . . . >F As ∪ {b} >F As+1 >F . . . >F Ar. (4)
Proof. Consider first the case where for all s it does not hold that b ∼ As. In this case for all
s either b >F As or As >F b. Since b >F As implies b >F As+1 >F . . . and As′ >F b implies
. . . >F As′−1 >F As′ >F b for all s, s
′ by transitivity, equation (3) follows.
Next assume b ∼ As. We argue that in this case
. . . >F As−1 >F {b} >F As+1 >F . . . ,
which implies 4.
Suppose by contradiction that b >F As+1 does not hold. Then there exists an element a ∈ As+1
and a profile σ where F (σ) ranks a above b. From the fact that b ∼ As it follows that there exist
c ∈ As and a profile σ
′ where F (σ′) ranks b above c above a. We now look at the constitution F
restricted to B = {a, b, c}. For each of a, b, c there exist at least one profile where they are not at
the top/bottom of the social outcome. It therefore follows that Theorem 2.6 applies to FB and that
FB is a dictator. However, the assumption that As >F As+1 implies that c >F a. A contradiction.
The proof that Fs−1 >F b is identical.
Lemma 3.2. Let F be a constitution satisfying transitivity and IIA. Let A be a set of alternatives
such that FA is a dictator and b ∼ A. Then FA∪{b} is a dictator.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that FA(σ) = σ(i). Let a ∈ A be such that there exist a
profile where F ranks a above b and c ∈ A be such there exists a profile where a is ranked below
c. Let B = {a, b, c}. Then FB satisfies the condition of Theorem 2.6 and is therefore dictator.
Moreover since the fa>c(x) = x(i) it follows that fa>b(x) = x(i) and f b>c(x) = x(i). Let d be any
other alternative in A. Let B = {a, b, d}. Then since fa>b(x) = fa>d(x) = x(i), the conditions of
Theorem 2.6 hold for FB and therefore f
b>d(x) = x(i). We have thus concluded that FA∪{b}(σ) = σ
for all σ as needed. The proof for the case where FA(σ) = −σ is identical.
Theorem 2.6 also immediately implies the following:
Lemma 3.3. Let F be a constitution satisfying transitivity and IIA. Let A be a set of two alterna-
tives such that FA is not constant and b ∼ A. Then FA∪{b} is a dictator.
We can now prove Theorem 1.3.
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of alternatives k. The case k = 2 is trivial. Either
F always ranks a above b in which case {a} >F {b} as needed or F is a non-constant function in
which case the set A = {a, b} satisfies the desired conclusion.
For the induction step assume the theorem holds for k alternatives and let F be a constitution
on k+1 alternatives which satisfies IIA and Transitivity. Let B be a subset of k of the alternatives
and b = A \B.
By by the induction hypothesis applied to FB , we may write B as a disjoint union of A1, . . . , Ar
such that A1 >F A2 > . . . >F Ar and such that if As is of size 3 or more then FAs is a dictator and
if FAs is of size two then FAs is non constant. We now apply Lemma 3.1. If (3) holds then the proof
follows. If (4) holds then the proof would follow once we show that FC is of the desired form where
C = As∪{b}. If As is of size 1 then from the definition of ∼ it follows that FAs∪{b} is non-constant
as needed. If As is of size 2 then Lemma (3.3) implies that FAs∪{b} is a dictator as needed and for
the case of As of size 3 or more this follows from Lemma (3.2). The proof follows.
4 Conclusion and Followup Work
A major motivation for the work presented here comes from the desire to obtain quantitative
versions of Arrow theorem, where the goal is to derive lower bounds on the probability of a paradox.
Consider n voters who vote independently at random, each following the uniform distribution over
the 6 rankings of 3 alternatives. Arrow’s theorem implies that any constitution which satisfies IIA
and Unanimity and is not a dictator has a probability of at least 6−n for a non-transitive outcome,
where n is the number of voters. When n is large, 6−n is a very small probability, and the question
arises if for large number of voters it is possible to avoid paradoxes with probability (exponentially)
close to 1.
In a follow up paper [?] which uses some of the techniques developed here we derive such a
quantitative theorem. In other words, we show that for all ǫ > 0, there exists δ(ǫ) > 0, which
does not depend on n such that if a constitution F satisfies IIA and the probability that F (σ) is
transitive is at least 1 − δ, then it is ǫ close to a function whose probability of paradox is 0, i.e.,
one of the functions listed in Theorem 1.3.
A key feature of this new result is that it does not use a quantitative version of unanimity.
Indeed, while it is easy to quantify Non Degeneracy, say by looking at min(P[f = 1],P[f = −1]),
there is no natural way to quantify Unanimity. Prior quantitative work on Arrow theorem [5, 6]
typically made strong assumptions on min(P[f = 1],P[f = −1]) and does not allow to obtain
quantitative estimates when the number above is smaller than some constant (say 1/100).
In addition to the proof ideas presented here, the quantitative proof of Arrow theorem, uses
a number of sophisticated mathematical tools including the theory of influences, inverse hyper-
contractive estimates and non-linear invariance principles.
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